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Abstract
Pre-publication peer review should be abolished. We consider the
effects that such a change will have on the social structure of science,
paying particular attention to the changed incentive structure and the
likely effects on the behavior of individual scientists. We evaluate these
changes from the perspective of epistemic consequentialism. We find
that where the effects of abolishing pre-publication peer review can
be evaluated with a reasonable level of confidence based on presently
available evidence, they are either positive or neutral. We conclude
that on present evidence abolishing peer review weakly dominates the
status quo.
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1 Introduction
Peer review plays a central role in contemporary academic life. It sits at the
critical juncture where scientific work is accepted for publication or rejected.
This is particularly clear when the results of scientific work are communicated
to non-scientists, e.g., by journalists. The question “Has this been peer
reviewed?” is commonly asked, and a positive answer is frequently taken to
be a necessary and sufficient condition for the results to be considered serious
science.
Given these circumstances, one might expect peer review to be an impor-
tant topic in the philosophy of science as well. Peer review should arguably
play a more prominent role in the debate about demarcation criteria (what
separates science from other human pursuits?), as it seems to be used in
practice exactly to differentiate scientific knowledge from other claims to
knowledge, at least by journalists. Yet as far as we know, social-procedural
accounts of science, like the one found in Longino (1990), remain in the
minority and usually do not place great emphasis on peer review in particu-
lar. Aside from this particular debate, there are normative questions about
the proper epistemic role of peer review and more practical questions about
the extent to which it manages to fulfill them, all of which should interest
philosophers of science.
But there has been surprisingly little work on peer review by philoso-
phers of science. Most of what exists has focused on the role of biases in
peer review, see for example Saul (2013, §2.1), Lee et al. (2013), Jukola
(2017), Katzav and Vaesen (2017), and Heesen (2018). We are not aware of
any philosophical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of peer review
as such (the above examples presuppose its overall legitimacy by discussing
its implementation). Some work along these lines does exist outside of phi-
losophy, either in the form of opinion pieces (Gowers 2017) or occasionally
full-length articles (Smith 2006). Such work tends to be vague about the
normative standard against which peer review or its alternatives are to be
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evaluated, something we aim to remedy in section 2.
Here we bring together the work of philosophers of science (especially
social epistemologists of science) who have written about the strengths and
weaknesses of various aspects of the social structure of science and empirical
work about the effects of peer review. We argue that where philosophers of
science have claimed the social structure of science works well, their argu-
ments tend to rely on things other than peer review, and that where specific
benefits have been claimed for peer review, empirical research has so far
failed to bear these out. Comparing this to the downsides of peer review,
most prominently the massive amount of time and resources tied up in it, we
conclude that we might be better off abolishing peer review.
Some brief clarifications. Our target is pre-publication peer review, that
is the review of a manuscript intended for publication, where publication is
withheld until one or more editors deem the manuscript to have successfully
passed peer review. We set aside other uses of peer review (e.g., of grant
proposals or conference abstracts) and we explicitly leave room for post-
publication peer review, where manuscripts are published before review. Be-
cause of this last point, some readers may think that our terminology (‘abol-
ishing pre-publication peer review’) suggests a more dramatic change than
what we actually advocate. We invite such readers to substitute in their
preferred terminology. We should also clarify that we use ‘science’ in a broad
sense to include the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.
The overall structure of our argument is as follows. We think there are
a number of clear benefits to abolishing pre-publication peer review. In con-
trast, while various benefits of the existing system (downsides of abolishing
peer review) have been suggested, we do not think there exist any that have
clear empirical support. Insofar as empirical research exists, it is ambiguous
in some cases, and speaks relatively clearly against the claimed benefit of the
existing system in others. While we admit to a number of cases where the
evidence is ambiguous or simply lacking (see especially section 5), we claim
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that the present state of the evidence suggests that abolishing pre-publication
peer review would lead to a Pareto improvement: each factor considered is
either neutral or favors our proposal.
Our primary aim here is to evaluate the current system, but we believe
that is only really possible by comparing it to an alternative. We are not
claiming that the proposal we put forward is the best of all possible alter-
natives. It has been constructed to be a system which could constitute a
Pareto improvement over the current system. Given that it has not actually
been implemented yet, we cannot guarantee it would work as advertised or
what empirical properties it would have. But in offering a relatively specific
alternative, we hope to get people thinking about real change, which pointing
out problems with the present system has so far failed to do.
Even despite this proviso, we realize that ours is a strong claim, and our
proposal a large change to the social structure of science. It is therefore im-
portant to highlight that our central claim concerns the balance of presently
available evidence. We are not further claiming that the matter is so con-
clusively settled as to render further research superfluous or wasteful. On
the contrary, we think there are a number of points in our argument where
the presently available evidence is severely limited, and we take the calls for
further empirical research we make in those places to be just as important a
part of the upshot of our paper as our positive proposal. We hope, therefore,
that even a skeptical reader will read on; if not to be convinced of the need
of abolishing pre-publication peer review, then at least to see where in our
view their future research efforts should concentrate if they are to shore up
pre-publication peer review’s claims to good epistemic standing.
2 Setting the Stage
The purpose of peer review is usually construed in terms of quality control.
For example, Katzav and Vaesen (2017, 6) write “The epistemic role of peer
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review is assessing the quality of research”, and this seems to be a common
sentiment per, e.g., Eisenhart (2002, 241) and Jukola (2017, 125). But how
well does peer review succeed in its purpose of quality control? The empirical
evidence (reviewed below) is mixed at best. As one prominent critic puts it,
“we have little evidence on the effectiveness of peer review, but we have
considerable evidence on its defects” (Smith 2006, 179).
Peer review’s limited effectiveness would perhaps not be a problem if it
required little time and effort from scientists. But in fact the opposite is
true. Going from a manuscript to a published paper involves many hours of
reviewing work by the assigned peer reviewers and a significant time invest-
ment from the editor handling the submission. The editor and reviewers are
all scientists themselves, so the epistemic opportunity cost of their reviewing
work is significant: instead of reviewing, they could be doing more science.
Given these two facts—high (epistemic) costs and unclear benefits—we
raise the question whether it might be better to abolish pre-publication peer
review. In the following we provide our own survey and assessment of the
evidence that bears on this question. Our conclusions are not sympathetic to
peer review. However, we encourage any proponents of peer review to give
their own assessment. We only ask that any benefits claimed for peer review
are backed up by empirical research, and that they are epistemic benefits,
i.e., we ask for empirical evidence that peer review makes for better science
on science’s own terms.
We take the status quo to be as follows. The vast majority of scientific
work is shared through journal publications, and the vast majority of journals
uses some form of pre-publication peer review. Ordinarily this means that
an editor assigns one to three peers (scientists whose expertise intersects
the topic of the submission), who provide a report and/or verdict on the
submission’s suitability for publication. The peer reviews feed into the final
judgment: the submission is accepted or rejected with or without revisions.
Our proposal is to abolish pre-publication peer review. Scientists them-
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selves will decide when their work is ready for sharing. When this happens,
they publish their work online on something that looks like a preprint archive
(although the term “preprint” would not be appropriate under our proposal).
Authors can subsequently publish updated versions that reply to questions
and comments from other scientists, which may have been provided publicly
or privately. Most journals will probably cease to exist, but the business of
those that continue will be to create curated collections of previously pub-
lished articles. Their process for creating these collections will presumably
still involve peer review, but now of the post-publication variety.
Our proposal is in line with how certain parts of mathematics and physics
already work: uploading a paper to arXiv is considered publishing it for
most purposes, with journal peer review and publication happening almost
as an afterthought (Gowers 2017). Indeed, journal publication can function
as something like a prize, accruing glory to the scientist who achieves it but
doing little to actually help spread or diffuse the idea beyond calling attention
to something that has already been made public elsewhere. We are not aware
of any detailed comparative studies of the effects these changes have had in
those fields, so we will not rest any significant part of our argument on this
case. But for those who worry that science will immediately and irrevocably
fall apart without peer review, we point out that this does not appear to
have happened in the relevant parts of mathematics and physics.
In the remainder of this paper we break down the consequences of our
proposal. Our strategy here is to focus on a large number (hopefully all)
aspects of the social structure of science that will be affected. In particular,
the reader may already have a particular objection against our proposal in
mind. We encourage such a reader to skip ahead to the section where this
objection is discussed before reading the rest of the paper.
For example, one reader may think that peer review as currently prac-
ticed is important because it forces scientists to read and review each other’s
work, and without peer review they will spend less time on such tasks. This
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is discussed in section 3.2. Another reader may worry that without peer
review and the journal publications that go with them it will be more diffi-
cult to evaluate scientists for hiring or promotion (section 3.5). Yet another
reader may be concerned about losing peer review’s ability to prevent work
of little merit from being published, or at least to sort papers into journals
by epistemic merit so scientists can easily find good work (section 4.1). A
fourth reader might think peer review plays an important role in detecting
fraud or other scientific malpractice (section 4.2). A fifth reader may think
the guarantee provided to outsiders when something has been peer reviewed
is an important reason to preserve the status quo (section 5.1). And a sixth
reader may want to point out that anonymized peer review gives relatively
unknown scientists a chance at an audience by publishing in a prestigious
journal, whereas on our proposal perhaps only antecedently prominent sci-
entists will have their work read and engaged with (section 5.2).
Other aspects of the social structure of science that will be considered:
whether and when scientists share their work (section 3.1), how many papers
are published by women or men (section 3.3), library resources (section 3.4),
the power of editors as gatekeepers (section 3.6), science’s susceptibility to
fads and fashions (section 4.3), and ways to get credit for scientific work other
than through journal publications (section 4.4). In each case we evaluate
whether the net effects of our proposal on that aspect can be expected to be
positive. To tip our hand: aspects where we will claim a benefit are gathered
in section 3, aspects where we expect little or no change are in section 4,
and aspects that we consider neutral due to a present lack of evidence are in
section 5.
In making these evaluations, we commit to a kind of epistemic consequen-
tialism (cf. Goldman 1999). One may think of what we are doing as roughly
analogous to the utilitarian principle, where for each issue our yardstick is
whether pre-publication peer review shall generate the greatest amount of
knowledge produced in the least amount of time. More specifically, we con-
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sider changes in the incentive structure and expected behaviour of scientists,
as well as other changes that would result from abolishing pre-publication
peer review. We evaluate these changes in terms of their expected effect on
the ability of the scientific community to produce scientific knowledge in an
efficient manner. Working out in detail what such an epistemic consequen-
tialism would look like would be very complicated, and we do not attempt
the task here. For most of the issues we consider, we think that the calculus
is sufficiently clear that fine details do not matter. Where it is unclear (the
issues discussed in section 5) we think this results from ignorance of empirical
facts about the likely effect of policies, rather than conceptual unclarity in
the evaluative metric. So we do not need to use our consequentialist yard-
stick to settle any difficult tradeoffs. All we need for our purposes is to make
it clear that we are evaluating the peer review system by how well it does in
incentivizing efficient knowledge production.
What do we mean by the incentive structure of science, mentioned in the
previous paragraph? This addresses the motivations of scientists. Scientists
are rewarded for their contributions with credit, i.e., with recognition from
their peers as expressed through such things as awards, citations, and presti-
gious publications (Merton 1957, Hull 1988, Zollman 2018). Scientific careers
are largely built on the reputations scientists acquire in this way (Latour and
Woolgar 1986, chapter 5). As a result, scientists engage in behaviors that
improve their chances of credit (Merton 1969, Dasgupta and David 1994,
Zollman 2018).
While individual scientists may be motivated by credit to different degrees
(curiosity, the thrill of discovery, and philanthropic goals are important moti-
vations for many as well), the effect on careers means that credit-maximizing
behavior is to some extent selected for. Thus we think it important to ensure
that our proposal does not negatively affect the incentives currently in place
for scientists to work effectively and efficiently.
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3 Benefits of Abolishing Peer Review
3.1 Sharing Scientific Results
An important feature of (academic) science is that there is a norm of sharing
one’s findings with the scientific community. This has been referred to as the
communist norm (Merton 1942). In recent surveys, scientists by and large
confirm both the normative force of the communist norm and their actual
compliance (Louis et al. 2002, Macfarlane and Cheng 2008, Anderson et al.
2010). This norm is epistemically beneficial to the scientific community, as
it prevents scientists from needlessly duplicating each other’s work.
Will abolishing peer review affect this practice? In order to answer this
question, we need to know what motivates scientists to comply with the
communist norm, that is to share their work. On the one hand there is the
feeling that they ought to share generated by the existence of the norm itself.
There is no reason to expect this to be changed by abolishing peer review.
On the other hand there is the motivation generated by the desire for
credit. According to the priority rule, the first scientist to publish a particular
discovery gets the credit for it (Merton 1957, Dasgupta and David 1994,
Strevens 2003). So a scientist who wants to get credit for her discoveries has
an incentive to publish them as quickly as possible, in order to maximize her
chances of being first. Recent work suggests that this applies even in the
case of smaller, intermediate discoveries (Boyer 2014, Strevens 2017, Heesen
2017b). All of this helps motivate scientists to share their work.
If peer review were to be abolished, the communist norm and the priority
rule would still be in effect, so scientists would still be motivated to share
their work as quickly as possible. However, the following change would occur.
In the absence of pre-publication peer review, scientists would be able to
share their discoveries more quickly. In the current system, peer review can
hold up publication for significant amounts of time, especially in the case of
fields with high rejection rates or long turnaround times. During this time,
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other scientists cannot build on the work and may spend their time needlessly
duplicating the work. Cutting out this lag by letting scientists publish their
own work when they think it is ready will speed up scientific progress. While
being faster is not always better (it may increase the risk of error, cf. Heesen
2017c), in this case delays in publication are reduced without any reduction
in the time spent on the scientific work itself.
To some extent this already occurs. Scientists, especially well-connected
scientists, already share preprints that make the community aware of their
work in advance of publication. For people who regularly do this, practi-
cally speaking little would change upon adopting the system we advocate.
However, our proposal turns pre-journal-publication dispersal of work from
a privilege of a well-connected few into the norm for everyone.
On this point, then, abolishing peer review is a net positive, as scientists
will still be incentivized to share their work as soon as possible, but the delays
associated with pre-publication peer review are removed.
3.2 Time Allocation
The current system restricts the way scientists are allowed to spend their
time. For each paper submitted to a journal, a number of scientists are
conscripted into reviewing it, and at least one editor has to spend time on
that paper as well.
On our proposal, scientists would be free to choose how much of their time
to spend reading and reviewing others’ work as compared to other scientific
activities. Some scientists would spend less time reviewing, some scientists
would spend more, and some would spend exactly as much as under the
current system.
For scientists in the latter category our proposal makes no difference,
while for scientists in the other two categories our proposal represents a net
improvement of how they spend their time, at least in their own judgments.
We think people are the best judges of how to use their own time and labor.
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We thus trust scientists’ decisions in these regards, and welcome changes that
would render many scientists’ choices about how to allocate their own labor
independent of the preferences of the relatively small number of editorial
gatekeepers.
So we assume that scientists are well-placed to judge how best to use their
own abilities to meet the community’s epistemic needs. We claim, moreover,
that the reward structure of science is set up so as to make it in their interest
to do so: the credit economy incentivizes scientists to spend their time on
pursuits the epistemic value of which will be recognized by the community
(Zollman 2018). Hence freeing up the way scientists allocate their time leads
to net epistemic benefits to the scientific community.
One might object that journals perform a useful epistemic sorting role,
telling scientists what is worth spending their time on. We will address these
concerns in section 4.1.
One might think that this would lead scientists to spend significantly less
time reading and reviewing others’ work. If this is right, we still think it
would be an overall improvement for the reasons mentioned above. But we
also want to point out that this is not as obvious a consequence as it may
seem. Here are two reasons to expect scientists to spend as much time or more
reading and reviewing on our proposal. First, for many scientists reading and
reviewing are intrinsically valuable and can help their own research. Second,
the current system provides no particular incentive to read and review either:
scientists agree to review only because they independently want to or because
they feel an obligation to the research community. While no one scientist is
conscripted, at the group level editors are going to keep going until they
find someone. This can amount to picking whomever is most weak-willed or
under some extra-epistemic social pressure. It is not obvious that this way
of deciding who does the reviewing has much to recommend it. Any rewards
that exist for reviewing will still exist on our proposal, and may be amplified
by the possibility of making post-publication reviews public.
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3.3 Gender Skew in Publications
Male scientists publish more, on average, than female scientists, a phe-
nomenon known as the productivity puzzle or productivity gap (Zuckerman
and Cole 1975, Valian 1999, Prpić 2002, Etzkowitz et al. 2008). Several ex-
planations have been suggested, none of which are entirely satisfactory (see
especially Etzkowitz et al. 2008, 409–412). Two of these explanations that
are relevant to our concerns here are the direct effects of gender bias and the
indirect effects of the expectation of gender bias.
There is some evidence of gender bias in peer review, although this is
not unambiguous (see Lee et al. 2013, 7–8, Lee 2016, and references therein).
Insofar as there is gender bias—in the sense of women’s work being judged
more negatively by peer reviewers—abolishing peer review will remove this
and help level the playing field for men and women. We expect positive epis-
temic consequences from the removal of these arbitrarily different standards.
While the evidence of gender bias in peer review is not entirely clear-cut,
there is good evidence that women expect to face gender bias in peer review
(see Lee 2016, Bright 2017b, Hengel 2018, and references therein). In an effort
to overcome this perceived bias, women tend to hold their own work to higher
standards. Hengel (2018) provides evidence that women spend more time
correcting stylistic aspects of their paper during peer review, presumably due
to higher expectations of scrutiny on such apparently superficial elements of
their work. On the plausible assumption that if women have higher standards
for each paper they will produce fewer papers overall, this means that the
mere expectation of gender bias can contribute to the productivity gap.
After abolishing peer review both women and men will hold their work
primarily to their own individual standards of quality, and secondarily to
their expectations of the response of the entire scientific community, but not
to their expectations of the opinion of a small arbitrary group of gatekeepers.
We do not know whether this will lead the women to behave more like the
men (producing more papers) or the men to behave more like the women
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(holding individual papers to a higher standard of quality). However, in line
with our view above that scientists are well-placed to judge how best to spend
their own time, we take it that any resulting change in behavior will be a net
epistemic positive.
3.4 Library Resources
Journal subscription fees currently take up a large amount of library re-
sources (RIN 2008, Van Noorden 2013). To summarize some key figures
from the 2008 report: research libraries in the UK spent between £208,000
and £1,386,000 on journal subscriptions annually (and that was a decade ago,
with subscriptions having risen substantially since). The cost for publishing
and distributing a paper was estimated to be about £4,000, or about £6.4
billion per year in total. Savings from moving to author-paid open access
were estimated at £561 million, about half of which would directly benefit
libraries.
On our proposal, this is replaced by the cost of maintaining one or more
online archives of scientific publications. The example of existing large
preprint archives like arXiv and bioRxiv suggests that maintaining such
archives can be done at a fraction of the cost currently spent on journal
subscription fees. As a rough guideline, Van Noorden (2013) estimates main-
tenance costs of arXiv at just $10 per article. So our proposal involves
significant savings on library resources, which could be used to expand col-
lections, retain more or better trained staff, or other purposes that would be
of epistemic benefit to the scientific community.
Two additional effects should be considered in relation to this. First,
the fact that the online archive will be open access means that scientific
publications will be available to everyone, not just to those with a library
subscription or some other form of access to for-profit scientific journals.
Second, the fact that any value added by for-profit journals would be
taken away. The two tasks currently carried out by journals that could
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plausibly be supposed to add value to scientific publications are peer review
and copy-editing (Van Noorden 2013). It is the purpose of all other sections
of this paper to argue that peer review does not in fact (provably) add value,
so we set that aside. This leaves copy-editing. We propose that libraries use
some of the funds freed up from journal subscriptions to employ some copy-
editors. Each university library would make copy-editing services available to
the scientists employed at that university. We contend that, after paying for
the maintenance of an online archive and a team of copy-editors, under our
proposal libraries would still end up with more resources for other pursuits
than under the current system.
We note that this particular advantage of our proposal is a bit more
historically contingent than the others. There seems to be no particular
reason why pre-publication peer review has to be implemented through for-
profit journals, and if the open access movement has its way we might be
able to free up these library resources without abolishing pre-publication peer
review. But our proposal also achieves this goal, and so we count it as an
advantage relative to the system as it is currently actually implemented.
3.5 Scientific Careers
The ‘publish or perish’ culture in science has been widely noted (e.g., Fanelli
2010). Universities judge the research productivity of scientists through their
publications in (peer reviewed) journals, with some focusing more on ‘quan-
tity’ (counting publications) and others on ‘quality’ (publishing in prestigious
journals). Scientific journals and the system of pre-publication peer review
thus play an important role in shaping scientific careers. What will become
of this if peer review is abolished?
We note first that the ‘publish or perish’ culture is a subset of a larger
system which we discussed above: the credit economy. Publishing in a jour-
nal is one way to receive credit for one’s work, but there are others, most
prominently citations and awards. Scientific careers depend on all of these,
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with different institutions weighting quantity of publications, quality of pub-
lications, citation metrics, and awards and other honors differently.
Any of these types of credit represents some kind of recognition of the
scholarly contributions of the scientist by her peers. But here we distinguish
two types of credit, which we will call short-run credit and long-run credit.
Getting a paper through peer review yields a certain amount of credit: more
for more prestigious journals, less for less prestigious ones. But this is short-
run credit in the following sense. The editor and the peer reviewers judge
the technical adequacy and the potential impact of the paper, shortly after
it is written. Their judgment is essentially a prediction of how much uptake
the paper is likely to receive in the scientific community.
In contrast, citations (as well as awards, prizes, inclusion in anthologies
or textbooks, etc.) represent long-run credit. They are the uptake the paper
receives in the scientific community. Long-run credit is both a more consid-
ered opinion of the scientific importance of the paper and a more democratic
one (citations can be made by anyone, and awards usually reflect a consen-
sus in the scientific community, whereas peer review is normally done by up
to three individuals). So long-run credit reflects a more direct and better
estimate of the real epistemic value of a contribution to science.
So what would the effect of our proposal be? For better or worse, our
proposal does not make it impossible for universities to use metrics to judge
research productivity. While journal rankings and impact factors would dis-
appear, citation metrics for individual scientists and papers would still be
available. This may mean that universities stop judging their scientists based
on the impact factors of the journals they publish in and start judging them
on the actual citation impact of their papers. More generally, our proposal
will decrease or remove the role of short-run credit in shaping career out-
comes and increase the role of long-run credit, which we take to be a better
measure of scientific importance. So we think this is an improvement on the
status quo.
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What about junior hires and related career decisions, where long-run
credit may be absent or minimal? If abolishing peer review means com-
pletely getting rid of journals and the associated prestige rankings, this robs
hiring departments of some information regarding the scientific importance
of candidates’ work. If this means those on the hiring side need to read and
form an opinion of candidates’ work for themselves, we do not think that is
a bad thing. This would of course take time, but if journals and peer review
are completely abolished, that just means the time spent reviewing the paper
is transferred to the people considering hiring the scientist, which again, we
do not think is a bad thing. In fact, since very few academics are on a hiring
committee year after year, whereas referee requests are a constant feature
while one is in the community, we think that even this added burden when
hiring might still be a net time-saver for academics.
But it does not have to be that way. We never said journals and peer
review have to be completely abolished—our proposal in section 2 explicitly
suggests journal issues may still appear, but as curated collections of articles
based on post-publication peer review. So short-run credit based on jour-
nal prestige need not disappear. It need not even be slower as there is no
particular reason post-publication peer review needs to take longer than pre-
publication peer review. But there is the added advantage that the paper
is already published while it undergoes peer review, so the wider commu-
nity outside the assigned reviewers also has a chance to respond before it is
included in a journal.
3.6 The Power of Gatekeepers
The discussion immediately above touched on another effect, one that we
think is worth bringing out as a benefit of our proposal in its own right. As
mentioned our proposal suggests that in evaluating the importance of scien-
tific work we decrease our reliance on short-run credit (journal prestige), with
a corresponding increase in long-run credit (citations, among other things).
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This means that the overall credit associated with a particular paper depends
less on the judgments made by an editor and a small number of reviewers,
and more on its actual uptake in the larger scientific community.
Editors in particular currently play a large role in determining which
scientific work is worthy of attention, as they are a relatively small group
of people with a deciding vote in the peer review process of a large number
of papers. They are often referred to as gatekeepers for this reason (Crane
1967). Our proposal entails significantly decreasing both the prevalence and
importance of this role. By replacing some of this importance with long-run
credit, which comes from the scientific community as a whole, it makes the
evaluation of scientific work a more democratic process. Not only is there
some reason to think that democratic evaluation of scientific claims is more
in line with general communal norms accepted within science (Bright et al.
2018), but general arguments from democratic theory and social epistemology
of science give epistemic reason to welcome the increased independence of
judgment and evaluation this would introduce (List and Goodin 2001, Heesen
et al. forthcoming, Perović et al. 2016, 103–104).
4 Where Peer Review Makes No Difference
In this section we consider a number of aspects of the scientific incentive
structure for which we think a case can be made that abolishing peer review
will leave them basically unaffected. This serves partially to forestall objec-
tions to our proposal that we anticipate from defenders of the peer review
system, and partially to avoid overstating our case—in some of what follows
we argue that abolishing peer review will likely have no effect in cases where
one might have expected it to be beneficial.
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4.1 Epistemic Sorting
Given the stated purpose of peer review mentioned in section 2 the first
and most apparent disadvantage of our proposal is that it would remove
the epistemic filter on what enters into the scientific literature. One might
worry that the scientific community would lose the ability to maintain its
own epistemic standards, and thus the general quality of scientific research
would be reduced. We argue here that despite the intuitive support this idea
might have, the present state of the literature on scientific peer review does
not support it.
Separate out two kind of epistemic standards one may hope that the
peer review system maintains. First, that peer review allows us to identify
especially meritorious work and place it in high profile journals, while ensur-
ing that especially shoddy work is kept from being published. Call this the
‘epistemic sorting’ function of peer review. Second, that peer review allows
for the early detection of fraudulent work or work that otherwise involves
research misconduct. Call this the ‘malpractice detection’ function of peer
review. We deal with each of these in turn.
Let us step back and ask why, from the point of view of epistemic conse-
quentialism, one would want peer review to do any sort of epistemic sorting.
We take the answer to be that epistemic sorting helps scientists fruitfully
direct their time and energy by selecting the best work and bringing it to
scientists’ attention through publication in journals. They read and respond
to that which is most likely to help them advance knowledge in their field.
How could peer review achieve this? One might hope that peer review
functions by keeping bad manuscripts out of the published literature and
letting good manuscripts in. This, however, is a non-starter. There are
far too many journals publishing far too many things, with standards of
publication varying far too wildly between them, for the sheer fact of having
passed peer review somewhere to be all that informative as to the quality of
a manuscript.
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Instead, if peer review is to serve anything like this purpose it must be
because reviewers are able (even if imperfectly) to discern the relative degree
of scientific merit of a work, and sort it into an appropriately prestigious
journal. Epistemic sorting happens not via the binary act of granting or
withholding publication, but rather through sorting manuscripts into journals
located on a prestige hierarchy that tracks scientific merit.
A necessary condition for epistemic sorting to work as advertised is that
reviewers be reliable guides to the merit of the scientific work they review.
Our first critique is that this necessary condition does not seem to be met.
Investigation into reviewing practices has not generally found much inter-
reviewer reliability in their evaluations (Peters and Ceci 1982, Ernst et al.
1993, Lee et al. 2013, 5–6). What this means is that one generally cannot
predict what one reviewer will think of a manuscript by seeing what another
reviewer thought. If there was some underlying epistemic merit scientists
were accurately (even if falteringly) discerning by means of their reviews,
one would expect there to be correlations in reviewers evaluations. However,
this is not what we find. Indeed, one study of a top medical journal even
found that “reviewers. . . agreed on the disposition of manuscripts at a rate
barely exceeding what would be expected by chance” (Kravitz et al. 2010, 3).
Findings like these are typical in the literature that looks at inter-reviewer
reliability (for a review of the literature see Bornmann 2011, 207). The avail-
able evidence does not provide much support for the idea that pre-publication
peer review detects the presence of some underlying quality.
Our second critique of the epistemic sorting idea speaks more directly
to the ideal it tracks. We are not persuaded that the best way to direct
scientists’ attention is to continually alert them to the best pieces of indi-
vidual work, and have them proportion their attention according to position
on a prestige hierarchy. We take it the intuition behind this is a broadly
meritocratic one. This intuition has been challenged by some modeling work
(Zollman 2009). While Zollman retained some role for peer review, his model
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still found that striving to select the best work for publication is not necessar-
ily best from the perspective of an epistemic community; his model favored
a greater degree of randomization.
We do not wish to rest our case on the results of one model which in
any case does not fully align with our argument, but it highlights that the
ideal of meritocracy stands in need of more defense than it is typically given.
We take it that scientists most fruitfully direct their attention to that pack-
age of previous work and results which, when combined, provides them with
the sort of information and perspectives they need to best advance their own
epistemically valuable projects. It is a presently undefended assumption that
this package of work should be composed of works which are themselves indi-
vidually the most meritorious work, or that paying attention to the prestige
hierarchy of journals and proportioning one’s attention accordingly will be
useful in constructing such a package. Hence, even if it did turn out that the
peer review system could sort according to scientific merit, it is an under-
appreciated but important fact that this is not the end of the argument.
Further defense of the purpose of this kind of epistemic sorting is needed
from the point of view of epistemic consequentialism.
Before moving on we note a potential objection. Even if one did not think
that peer review was detecting some underlying quality or interestingness,
one might think that the process of feedback and revision which forms part
of the peer review system would be beneficial to the epistemic quality of
the scientific literature. In this way epistemic sorting may have a positive
epistemic effect even if it fails in its primary task.
However, this returns us to the points regarding gatekeepers and time
allocation from section 3. We are not opposed to scientists reading each
other’s work, offering feedback, and updating their work in light of that.
This can indeed lead to improvements (Bornmann 2011, 203), though in this
context it is worth noting the results of an experiment in the biomedical
sciences, which found that attempting to attach the allure of greater prestige
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to more epistemically high caliber work did little to actually improve the
quality of published literature (Lee 2013). Fully interpreting these results
would require discussion of the measures of quality used in such literature.
We do not intend to do that here, since we do not intend to dispute the point
that it is desirable for scientists to give feedback and respond to it.
We would expect this sort of peer-to-peer feedback to continue under a
system without pre-publication peer review. Curiosity, informal networking,
collegial responsibilities, and the credit incentives to engage with others’ work
and make use of new knowledge before others do; these would all be retained
even without pre-publication peer review. What would be eliminated is the
assignment of reviewing duties to papers that scientists did not independently
decide were worth their time and attention, and the necessity of giving uptake
to criticism (in order to publish) independently of an author’s own assessment
of the value of that feedback.
We thus conclude that, from the point of view of epistemic consequen-
tialism, there is presently little reason to believe that a loss of the epistemic
sorting function of pre-publication peer review would be a loss to science.
Inclusion in the literature does not do much to vouch for the quality of a pa-
per; the evidence does not favor the hypothesis that reviewers are selecting
for some latent epistemic quality in order to sort into appropriate journals;
and the ideal underlying the claimed benefits of epistemic sorting is dubious.
While peer reviewers do give potentially valuable feedback, there is no partic-
ular reason to think that changes in how scientists decide to spend their time
would make things worse in this regard, and (per our arguments in section 3)
some reason to think that they would make things better.
4.2 Malpractice Detection
The other way peer review might uphold epistemic standards is through
malpractice detection. However, once again, the literature does not support
this. A number of prominent cases of fraudulent research managed to sail
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through peer review. Upon investigation into the behavior of those involved
it was found there was no reason to think that peer reviewers or editors were
especially negligent in their duties (Grant 2002, 3). Peer reviewers report
unwillingness to challenge something as fraudulent even where they have
some suspicion that this is so, and avoid the charge (Francis 1989, 11–12).
A criminologist who looked into fraudulent behavior in science reported that
“virtually no fraudulent procedures have been detected by referees because
reading a paper is neither a replication nor a lie-detecting device” (Ben-
Yehuda 1986, 6). A more recent survey of the evidence found, at the least,
no consistent pattern in journals’ self-reported ability to detect and weed out
fraudulent results (Anderson et al. 2013, 235).
Even if the prospect of peer review puts some people off committing
fraud, the fact that it is so unreliable at detecting fraud suggests that this is
a very fragile deterrence system indeed. Even this psychological deterrence
would be rapidly undermined by more adventurous souls, or those pushed by
desperation, since many would quickly learn that pre-publication peer review
is a paper tiger.
Conversely, there are various ways for malpractice detection to operate in
the absence of peer review. These include motive modification (Nosek et al.
2012, Bright 2017a), encouraging post-publication replication and scrutiny
(Bruner 2013, Romero 2017), and the sterner inculcation of the norms of sci-
ence coupled with greater expectation of oversight among coworkers (Braxton
1990). All of these methods of deterring fraud or meliorating its effects would
still be available under our proposal.
What evidence we now have gives little reason to suppose that abolishing
pre-publication peer review is any great loss to malpractice detection. Thus
in this regard our proposal would make no great difference to the epistemic
health of science. Combining this with the discussion of epistemic sorting, we
conclude there is presently no reason to believe pre-publication peer review
is adding much value to science by upholding epistemic standards.
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4.3 Herding Behavior
Where above we argued that pre-publication peer review is not making a
positive difference often claimed for it, in this section we downplay a po-
tential benefit of our proposal. A consistent worry about scientific behavior
is that it is subject to fads or, in any case, some sort of undesirable herd-
ing behavior (see, e.g. Chargaff 1976, Abrahamson 2009, Strevens 2013). A
natural thought is that pre-publication peer review encourages this, since by
its nature it means that to get new ideas out there one must convince one’s
peers that the work is impressive and interesting. It has thus been claimed
that pre-publication peer review encourages unambitious within-paradigm
work that unduly limits the range of scientific activity (Francis 1989, 12).
Reducing the incentive to herd might thus be claimed as a potential benefit
of our proposal. However, we are not convinced that it is pre-publication
peer review that is doing the harmful work here.
As mentioned above, our proposal eliminates or significantly reduces the
importance of short-run credit, the credit that accrues to one in virtue of
publishing in a (more or less prestigious) scientific journal. Long-run credit,
on the other hand, is left untouched. Under any sort of credit system, a
scientist needs to do work that the community will pay attention to, build
upon, and recognize her for. The mere fact that (she believes that) her peers
are interested in a topic and liable to respond to it is thus still positive reason
to adopt a topic. This is true even if the scientist would not judge that topic
to be the best use of her time if she were (hypothetically) free from the social
pressures and constraints of the scientific credit system.
The best that could be said about our proposal in this regard is that
scientists would not specifically have to pass a jury of peers before getting
their work out there. But given that we anticipate continued competition for
the attention of scientific coworkers, it is hard to say what the net effect in
encouraging more experimental or less conformist scientific work would be.
Whatever conformist effects the credit incentive has (see also the discus-
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sion immediately below) do not depend on whether it is short- or long-run
credit one seeks. The conformism comes from the fact that credit incentives
focus scientists’ attention on the predicted reaction of their fellow scientists
to their work. Pre-publication peer review might make this fact especially
salient by bringing manuscripts before a jury of peers before they may be
entered into the literature. But even without pre-publication peer review the
credit-seeking scientist must be focused on her peers’ opinions. So there is
no particular reason to think that removing the pre-publication scrutiny of
manuscripts will free scientists from their own anticipations of the fads and
fashions of their day.
4.4 Long-Run Credit
We end this section by noting that many of the effects of the credit economy of
science studied by social epistemologists really concern long-run credit rather
than the short-run credit affected by retaining or eliminating pre-publication
peer review. This point is not restricted to herding behavior.
For instance, social epistemologists have studied both the incentive to
collaborate, and various iniquities that can arise when scientists do not start
with equal power when deciding who shall do what work and how they
shall be credited (Harding 1995, Boyer-Kassem and Imbert 2015, Bruner
and O’Connor 2017, O’Connor and Bruner forthcoming). Whether or not
manuscripts would have to pass pre-publication peer review in order to enter
the scientific literature, there would still be benefits in the long run to col-
laboration, and (alas) there would still be social inequalities that allow for
iniquities to manifest in the scientific prestige hierarchy.
For another example, social epistemologists have studied the ways in
which the credit incentive encourages different strategies for developing a
research profile or molding one’s scientific personality to be more or less risk-
taking (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, Alexander et al. 2015, Thoma 2015).
Once again, pre-publication peer review plays no particular role in the analy-
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sis. The incentives to differentiate oneself from one’s peers (without straying
too far from the beaten path) and to mold one’s personality accordingly exist
independently of pre-publication peer review.
Two especially influential streams of work in the social epistemology of
science have been the study of the division of cognitive labor (Kitcher 1990,
Strevens 2003), and the role of credit in providing a spur to work in situations
with a risk of under-production (Dasgupta and David 1994, Stephan 1996).
These two streams have directed the focus of the field, and have formed some
of the chief defenses of the credit economy of science as it now stands (but
see Zollman 2018, for a more critical take).
We mention them here because pre-publication peer review or short-run
credit again plays no particular role in the analyses offered by these papers.
What drives their results is scientists’ expectation that genuine scientific
achievement will be recognized with credit. As we have argued above, it
is long-run credit that best tracks genuine scientific achievement, and so it
is long-run rather than short-run credit that grounds scientists’ expectation
in this regard. So in social epistemologists’ most prominent defenses of the
credit economy of science, long-run credit (while not named such) is the
mechanism underlying the claimed epistemic benefits of the credit economy.
5 Difficulties For Our Proposal
We have discussed some benefits that would predictably accrue from abol-
ishing peer review and some ways in which its apparent benefits are either
under-evidenced or better attributed to the effects of long-run credit, which
our proposal leaves untouched. We now discuss some cases which we take to
be more problematic for our proposal—but by this point we hope to have at
least convinced the reader that pre-publication peer review rests on shakier
theoretical grounds than its widespread acceptance may lead one to suppose.
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5.1 A Guarantee For Outsiders
One purpose pre-publication peer review serves is providing a guarantee to in-
terested but non-expert parties. Science journalists, policy makers, scientists
from outside the field the manuscript is aimed at, or interested non-scientists
can take the fact that something has passed peer review as a stamp of ap-
proval from the field. At a minimum, peer review guarantees that outsiders
are focusing on work that has convinced at least one relatively disinterested
expert that the manuscript is worthy of public viewing. Given that there are
real dangers to irresponsible science journalism or public action that is seen to
be based on science that is not itself trustworthy (Bright 2018, §4), and that
it is hard for non-experts to make the relevant judgment calls themselves,
having a social mechanism to provide this kind of guarantee for outsiders is
useful.
It is difficult to predict in advance what norms would come to exist for
science journalists in the absence of pre-publication peer review. We thus first
and foremost call for empirical research on this issue, possibly by studying
what has happened in parts of mathematics and physics that already operate
broadly along the lines we suggest (Gowers 2017).
However, against the presumption that things would be worse, we have
two points to make. As the recent replication crisis has made clear, the
value of peer review as a stamp of approval should not be overstated. There
are reasons to doubt that peer review reliably succeeds in filtering out false
results. We give three of them. First, peer reviewers face difficulties in
actually assessing manuscripts—and just about anything can pass peer re-
view eventually—as discussed under the heading of ‘epistemic sorting’ in sec-
tion 4.1. Second, there are problems with the standards we presently use to
evaluate manuscripts, in particular with the infamous threshold for statistical
significance used in many fields (Ioannidis 2005, Benjamin et al. 2018). And
third, deeper features of the incentive structure of science make replicabil-
ity problems endemic (Smaldino and McElreath 2016, Heesen 2017c). Using
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peer review as a stamp of approval may just be generating expert overcon-
fidence (Angner 2006), without the epistemic benefits of greater reliability
that would back this confidence up.
For the second part of our reply, recall that it is only pre-publication
peer review that we seek to eliminate. We do not object to post-publication
peer review resulting in papers being selected for inclusion in journals which
mark the community’s approval of such work, ideally after due and broad-
based evaluation. If some such system were implemented then outsiders could
use inclusion in such a journal as their marker of whether work is soundly
grounded in the relevant science.
If such a stamp of approval from a journal or other communally recog-
nized institution only comes a number of months or years after something is
first published then we would expect it to represent a more well-considered
judgment. Note that this would not necessarily slow the diffusion of knowl-
edge as under the present system the same paper would have spent time
hidden from view going through pre-publication peer review. The end re-
sult might not even be all that different from what happens in the present
system, except that post-publication peer review would take into account
more of the response or uptake from the wider scientific community. Thus it
would more closely approximate the considered judgment of the community,
as ultimately reflected in the long-run credit accorded to the paper.
5.2 A Runaway Matthew Effect
The second problem we are less confident we can deal with is that of ex-
acerbating the Matthew effect. This is the phenomenon, first identified by
Merton (1968), of antecedently more famous authors being credited more for
work done simultaneously or collaboratively, even if the relative size or skill
of their contribution does not warrant a larger share of the reward. Arguably
the present system helps put a damper on the Matthew effect, allowing a ju-
nior or less prestigious author to secure attention for their work by publishing
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in a high profile journal. Without such a mechanism to grab the attention of
the field, perhaps scientists would just decide what to pay attention to based
on their prior knowledge of the author or recommendation from others. This
would strengthen the effects of networks of patronage and prestige bias fa-
voring fancy universities. Thus squandering valuable opportunities to learn
from those who were not initially lucky in securing a prestigious position or
patronage from the already established.
While some have defended the Matthew effect (Strevens 2006), we will not
go that route in defending our proposal for two reasons. First, the Matthew
effect can perpetuate iniquities that themselves harm the generation and
dissemination of knowledge (Bruner and O’Connor 2017). Second, even if it
could be justified at the level of individual publications, its long-term effects
are epistemically harmful. The scientific community allocates the resources
necessary for future work on the basis of its recognition of past performance.
So if there is excess reward for some and unfair passing over of others at
the present stage of inquiry, this will ramify through to future rounds of
inquiry, misallocating resources to people whose accomplishments do not
fully justify their renown (Heesen 2017a). Hence on grounds of epistemic
consequentialism we take seriously the problem of a runaway Matthew effect.
As mentioned, due to the pressures of credit-seeking and their own cu-
riosity, scientists would still have incentive to read others’ work and adapt it
to suit their own projects. There is always a chance that valuable knowledge
may be gathered from the work of one who has been ignored, which could
provide an innovative edge. To some extent this creates opportunities for ar-
bitrage: if the Matthew effect ever became especially severe there would be a
credit incentive to specialize in seeking out the work of scientists who are not
getting much attention. The lesson here is that the Matthew effect can only
ever be so severe, before the credit incentive starts providing counter-veiling
motivations.
However, this does not fully solve our problem. Moreover, so long as
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resource allocation is tied to recognition of past performance the differences
in recognition generated by the Matthew effect can and often do become
self-fulfilling prophesies, as those with more gain the resources to do better
in the future, and those without are starved of the resources necessary to
show their worth.
It is not clear where to go from here. From the above it may seem like
a solution would be to pair our proposal with a call to loosen the connec-
tion between recognition of a scientist’s greatness based on their past per-
formance and resource allocation. Indeed, this may well be independently
motivated (Avin forthcoming, Heesen 2017a, §6). However, even short of this
far-reaching change, we feel at present that this matter deserves more study
rather than any definitive course of action.
Our present thought is that this is a very speculative objection, and there
is no empirical evidence to back up the claim that eliminating pre-publication
peer review will have dire consequences in this regard. In particular, while
the present system may (rarely) allow a relative outsider to make a big splash,
the common accusation of prestige bias in peer review (Lee et al. 2013, 7)
suggests that on the whole pre-publication peer review may contribute to the
Matthew effect rather than curtailing it.
More specifically, the Matthew effect can be made worse by peer review
when anonymity breaks down in ways that systematically favor antecedently
famous scientists. If this gives famous scientists more opportunities to publish
papers, then our system may provide welcome relief, since it allows more
people to get their papers out there. Hence whether our proposal makes the
Matthew effect worse or better depends on whether the stronger influence
would be who gets into the conversation (for which pre-publication peer
review can exacerbate the Matthew effect), or who gets listened to once the
conversation has begun (for which our proposal looks more problematic).
Presently we cannot say which is the more significant effect. So, while we
grant that a runaway Matthew effect may occur under our system, we prefer
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to stress that at this point it is just not known whether the Matthew effect
will be worse with or without pre-publication peer review.
What we propose is a large change, involving freeing up a lot of time and
opening it up to more self-direction on the part of scientists, and it is not clear
what sort of institutional changes it would be paired with. With more study
of epistemic mechanisms designed especially to promote the work of junior
or less prestigious scientists there might be found some way of surmounting
the problem of a runaway Matthew effect, should it arise. Ultimately, only
empirical evidence can settle these questions. Given the clear benefits and
the unclear downsides of our proposal, we hope at minimum to inspire a more
experimental attitude towards peer review.
6 Conclusion
Pre-publication peer review is an enormous sink of scientists’ time, effort,
and resources. Adopting the perspective of epistemic consequentialism and
reviewing the literature on the philosophy, sociology, and social epistemology
of science, we have argued that we can be confident that there would be
benefits from eliminating this system, but have no strong reasons to think
there will be disadvantages. There is hence a kind of weak dominance or
Pareto argument in favor of our proposal.
To simplify things, imagine forming a decision matrix, with rows cor-
responding to ‘Keeping pre-publication peer review’ and ‘Eliminating pre-
publication peer review’. The columns would each be labeled with an issue
studied by science scholars which we have surveyed here: gender bias in the
literature, speed of dissemination of knowledge, efficient allocation of scien-
tists’ time and attention, etc. For each column, if there is a clear reason to
think that either keeping or eliminating pre-publication scientific peer review
does better according to the standards of epistemic consequentialism, place
a 1 in the row of that option, and a 0 in the other. If there is no reason to
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favor either according to present evidence, put a 0 in both rows.
Our present argument could then be summarized with: as it stands,
the only 1s in such a table would appear in the row for eliminating pre-
publication peer review. We thus advocate eliminating pre-publication peer
review. Journals could still exist as a forum for recognizing and promoting
work that the community as a whole perceives as especially meritorious and
wishes to recommend to outsiders. Scientists would still have every reason
to read, respond to, and consider the work of their peers; pre-publication
peer review is not the primary drive behind either the intellect’s curiosity or
the will’s desire for recognition, and either of those suffice to motivate such
behaviors.
The overall moral to be drawn mirrors that of our invocation of the im-
portance of long-run over short-run credit. The best guarantor of the long
run epistemic health of science is science: the organic engagement with each
others’ ideas and work that arises from scientists deciding for themselves how
to allocate their cognitive labor, and doing the hard work of replicating and
considering from new angles those ideas that have been opened up to the
scrutiny of the community. All this would continue without pre-publication
peer review, and the best you can say for the system that currently uses up
so much of our time and resources is that it often fails to get in the way.
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